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Animal diseases can cause significant production losses and a reduction in livestock receipts.  While 
compensation is provided by the U.S. government in the event of an emergency disease outbreak, that 
compensation, an indemnity payment, does not cover the other costs that producers incur when their 
production cycle is interrupted.  Those other losses, consequential costs, include business interruption, 
loss of markets, reduced productivity, increased welfare costs and increased biosecurity compliance 
costs.  The recent Canadian experience with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, commonly 
referred to as mad cow disease) demonstrates the significance and magnitude of these other, market 
related, losses-- most significantly losses in exports.  
 
Federal and state governments have a role to play in minimizing disease risk because animal health 
has many of the characteristics of a public good.  A healthy livestock herd not only provides adequate 
food but also ensures that zoonotic diseases
1 are not transmitted to humans.  Animal health is a public 
good managed by federal and state governments and by individual producers.  Market incentives alone 
are insufficient to induce adequate supplies of animal health, so federal and state governments 
intervene to improve the supply of animal health.   
 
The actions taken by the U.S. to safeguard animal health are not readily understood or widely 
recognized outside of the animal health community.  A basic understanding of issues facing livestock 
disease risk management needs to be communicated to a wider community.  In this paper, we give a 
brief overview of U.S. animal health regulations, the role of the Animal Plant Health Inspection Service 
(APHIS), and discuss how livestock disease insurance, as supported by the USDA Risk Management 
Agency (RMA), may help bridge gaps in producer support.  This perspective provides an introduction to 
both public and private economic concerns resulting from disease outbreaks.  
 
Review of Animal Health Regulations 
 
Nine federal regulations define the national government activities
2 in mitigating livestock diseases.   
Diseases addressed in the regulations include brucellosis, chronic wasting disease, pseudorabies, 
scrapie, tuberculosis and various foreign animal diseases.  Brucellosis, pseudorabies, scrapie and 
tuberculosis have ongoing federally supported eradication programs that compensate producers for 
their part in removing those diseases from the national livestock herd.  Johne’s disease and avian 
influenza (AI) programs
3 were added recently and the government will concentrate on disease 
monitoring, surveillance, and eradication.  When livestock are depopulated, compensation values are 
usually determined by appraisal  but may be subject to budget constraints  or reduced by the amount of  
 
                                                 
1 Zoonotic diseases are those that are transmissible from animals to humans.  
2 The federal government is involved in many different disease management and exclusion activities.  This article 
only concentrates on the parts of federal and state regulations that concern animal disease management and 
eradication. 
3 Johne’s disease and the END regulations are in addition to the nine federal regulations identified when the 
review was completed in late 2002.   Western Economics Forum, April 2004 
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the animal’s salvage value.  Some programs may also cover cleaning, disinfection, transportation, or 
disposal, though the amount of this type of compensation is limited.   
 
The total number of state programs relating to animal disease management in 2002 was 119.  In the 
western states, there were 57 regulations addressing animal health and disease management.   Many 
of these programs cover multiple species and/or multiple diseases.  Most policies cover cattle, beef and 
dairy, and the most commonly mentioned disease is tuberculosis.  Other diseases specifically 
mentioned include brucellosis, foot  and  mouth  (FMD),  glanders,  classical  swine fever  (CSF;  hog 
cholera)  and  the  generic  “contagious diseases” category.  Table 1 lists the number of regulations 
identified in each western state, livestock species covered and diseases covered. 
 
Some western states have regulations with specific disease titles, while other regulations are more 
general and describe safeguarding and surveillance for animal health.  Most regulations are state 
department of agriculture regulations, though some are administered by marketing orders or industry 
groups.  Western states involved in the federal eradication programs generally have a corresponding 
regulation that covers the state’s role in satisfying federal requirements.   
 
Many of the state animal health regulations specify an appraisal and indemnification system.  Often 
appraisal values are capped at a specific proportion of the total appraised value of the animal (30%, 
50%) and only owners of the livestock are eligible for compensation.  When diseased animals find a 
secondary market, i.e. hides or for pet food, that salvage value is subtracted from the total state 
indemnity.  Breeding animals are sometimes mentioned in the regulations and indemnities tend to be 
higher but vary by state.  Funding for the indemnities also varies.  Funding for these programs may be 
appropriated by the legislature; costs may be shared with the county where the disease occurs.  Some 
states require per head assessments (CO) and other states tax producers (IA, KS, MS, MT).  None of 
the western state regulations cover cleaning, disinfection or other costs associated with animal disease 
mitigation.   
 
Opportunity for Insurance in Managing Livestock Disease Risks to Producers 
 
The discussion above, of federal and state animal disease regulations, demonstrates two significant 
shortcomings of the current indemnification process.  First, producers receive no compensation for 
consequential losses, the bulk of which are related to business interruption, resulting from a disease 
outbreak.  Business interruption, the inability to produce and market livestock, may occur in livestock 
production in a number of different ways.  Market access may be restricted because of quarantines, 
because commercial stock has been depopulated, because export markets are closed or because of 
reduced consumer demand.  During BSE outbreaks in Germany and Japan, consumer demand for beef 
plummeted.  Consumer demand was not significantly reduced during Canada’s recent BSE outbreak, 
but export markets were closed to Canadian beef, creating significant oversupply in the domestic 
marketplace.  Consequential losses associated with an animal disease always occur but risk 
management strategies to deal with their impact are underdeveloped. 
 
The second area of weakness in the western framework for animal disease compensation is the 
indemnification values for higher valued commercial livestock.  Owners of registered, purebred, and 
rare livestock have access to insurance markets, but many commercial breeding animals or genetically 
superior commercial livestock are not valuable enough to justify purchasing insurance.  These animals 
receive compensation that may not be sufficient compensation for their higher value compared to other 
commercial livestock.  Another issue related to insufficient indemnification values are pro-rated or 
capped indemnity payments.  The indemnity payments may be capped because of budget constraint or 
may be capped when the federal indemnification proportion is not matched by a state indemnification.  
Both undervaluation and limited indemnification values result in producers receiving compensation for 
their animals that is less than the market value of the animal prior to the disease outbreak.   
 Western Economics Forum, April 2004 
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Table 1: Western States Animal Disease Management Regulations 
  State  Number of 
Regulations  Species Diseases  Covered 
  Alaska  1 Dairy  cattle  Unspecified 
  Arizona  1 Unspecified  Tuberculosis  (TB) 
  California  3  Beef cattle, dairy cattle and unspecified 
livestock 
TB, brucellosis and 
unspecified diseases 
  Colorado  3  Captive cervids (deer, elk) and unspecified 
animals 
Brucellosis and other 
unspecified diseases 
 
Hawaii  4  Beef cattle, dairy cattle, swine 
Anaplasmosis, TB, 
brucellosis, classical swine 
fever (CSF)  
 
Idaho  4  Beef cattle, dairy cattle, swine, sheep, goats, 
captive cervids and unspecified animals 
FMD, BSE, CWD, other 
TSEs, TB, brucellosis, 
pseudorabies 
  Illinois  3  Swine and unspecified animals  Brucellosis, trichinosis and 
unspecified diseases 
  Indiana  1  Unspecified animals  FMD, glanders 
  Iowa  3  Beef cattle, dairy cattle and unspecified 
animals 
Farcy, anthrax, dourine, FMD, 
TB, brucellosis 
 
Kansas  4  Swine and unspecified animals 
Vesicular exanthema, 
pseudorabies, FMD and 
unspecified diseases 
  Michigan  1 Unspecified  Unspecified 
 






Montana  2 Unspecified  animals 
Rinderpest, surra, contagious 
pleurapneumonia, FMD, 
unspecified diseases 
  Nebraska  1  Beef cattle, dairy cattle  TB 
  Nevada  2  Sheep, unspecified animals  FMD and unspecified 
diseases 
 
New Mexico  1 Unspecified 




  North Dakota  1  Beef cattle, dairy cattle, swine, sheep, goats, 
captive cervids, equine 
Unspecified 
  Oklahoma  3  Beef cattle, dairy cattle and unspecified 
animals 
Brucellosis and unspecified 
diseases 
  Oregon  1 Unspecified  Unspecified 
 
South Dakota  5  Beef cattle, dairy cattle, swine, and 
unspecified animals 
Vesicular exanthema, CSF, 
brucellosis, TB and 
unspecified diseases 
  Texas  1 Unspecified  Unspecified 
  Utah  1 Unspecified  Unspecified 
  Washington  1 Unspecified  Unspecified 
 
Wisconsin  5  Beef cattle, dairy cattle, bison, captive cervids, 
swine and unspecified 
CWD, TB, brucellosis, 
pseudorabies and  
unspecified diseases 
  Wyoming  3  Beef cattle, dairy cattle, swine and unspecified 
animals 
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Livestock Risk Protection, Livestock Gross Margin  
and Adjusted Gross Revenue Insurance 
 
Two revenue insurance polices for hog producers are currently available, Livestock Risk Protection (LRP) 
and Livestock Gross Revenue (LGM).  In crop year 2004 feeder cattle and fed cattle policies for LRP were 
introduced across a variety of states.  LRP protects livestock producers from a decline in the prices for 
livestock during the policy term.  LGM protects against a decline in gross margin, defined as the value of the 
livestock minus the feed costs.  Both policies use futures markets to establish prices over two six-month 
periods during one crop year.  LGM has a specific closing sales date for each period, while LRP can be 
purchased anytime during each period.  For LRP, 70 to 95 percent of the daily price can be insured while 85 
to 100 percent of expected gross margin is insurable with LGM.  Both policies limit coverage to relatively 
small numbers of animals per crop year: LRP Swine, 32,000 head; LRP Fed Cattle, 4,000 head; LRP Feeder 
Cattle, 2,000 head and LGM 30,000 head of swine.   
 
After the outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in December 2003, the Risk Management 
Agency (RMA) suspended the sales of LRP for feeder and fed cattle.  LRP excludes mortality as a result of 
disease as a covered peril.  Policy holders who did not have diseased animals but suffered the impacts of 
reduced cattle prices resulting from the market impacts of disease discovery, however, would be eligible for 
payment.  Immediately after the BSE discovery, RMA reported a run on LRP cattle policy purchases and 
sales were suspended.  As of January 29, 2004 sales had not resumed.  
 
Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR) provides a guaranteed minimum revenue for the insurance period.  Multiple 
commodities are covered in the policy and protection is for natural disasters and market fluctuations.  AGR 
uses the producer’s IRS Schedule F tax returns over the most recent five years to establish a base income 
and then provides supplemental coverage by multiplying the approved AGR by the selected coverage level 
and payment rate.  Purchase of an AGR policy is limited to producers who earn no more than 35 percent of 
expected income from animals and animal products.  AGR-Lite allows coverage levels of 65, 75 or 80 
percent and coverage is limited to $250,000 of liability, all of which can be from livestock production.   
 
Source: RMA  
 
Considering these two state and federal compensation program shortcomings, there is an opportunity 
for insurance to be developed to assist in the management of livestock disease risks.  Following the 
passage of the Agricultural Risk Protection Act (ARPA) in 2000,  RMA has supported the development 
of livestock revenue insurance policies. The Livestock Risk Protection (LRP) policy was piloted in swine 
in Iowa in 2002 and extended  to feeder  and  fed cattle in 2003
4.    Other  policies,  Livestock Gross 
Margin (LGM),  Average Gross Revenue (AGR) and AGR-Lite provide revenue insurance for livestock 
producers in various states.  These products,  however,  limit the  total number  of head  or the  total 
value  of the herd  that can be insured.  AGR policies do allow for payments resulting from an 
unavoidable natural disaster and a resulting disease, but other disease mortality is not covered.   
Additional policies may be developed as RMA continues to support livestock insurance development as 
mandated in ARPA.  Projects are already underway to support insurance development for aquaculture 
and provide protection for forage and grazing supplies for livestock producers.  However, so far no 







                                                 
4 Beginning in the 2004 crop year (November 2003 policy sales begin), LRP will expand beyond IA to the 
following western states: IL, IN, KS, MN, NE, OK, TX, UT & WY.  LRP for fed cattle will be available in IL, IA, NE 
and for feeder cattle in CO, IA, KS, NE, NV, OK, SD, TX, UT and WY in CY 2004.   Western Economics Forum, April 2004 
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As the development of additional livestock insurance programs continues, alternative value and 
consequential loss insurance could be developed.  Alternative value insurance offers a way to address 
the two shortcomings previously discussed.  Alternative value insurance could provide producers the 
option to insure the value of the animal above the  indemnity value received.  Development of 
alternative value insurance can be facilitated by pre-published compensation schedules.  Currently, 
compensation schedules for livestock affected by emergency disease outbreaks are developed at the 
time of the outbreak.  If compensation schedules were published in advance,  insurance  could then  be 
purchased  for the difference  between  the livestock’s market  
value and the indemnification rate, essentially “topping up” the compensation.  Additionally, when 
indemnity payments are made  at a fraction  of the  appraised value,  alternative value insurance  can 
allow  producers to insure the difference between the appraised value and the actual indemnity value.  
These two insurance policies would need to be based on sound actuarial data for RMA to support their 
development.  However, actuarial data related to many diseases does not exist because those 
diseases have not occurred recently in the U.S.   
 
The second area where insurance can improve the management of disease risk is by covering 
consequential losses.  Consequential loss insurance would allow producers to purchase insurance to 
offset costs incurred from downtime, reduced productivity and loss of market not covered by 
government indemnity payments.  Other industries already use variants of consequential loss policies, 
especially for business interruption, that might be adaptable to livestock production.   
 
Evidence from Germany demonstrates that both alternative value and consequential loss policies for 
livestock producers can be developed and can work in parallel with government indemnity programs.  
In Germany, indemnity payments are made based on predetermined and published payment schedules 
(Bätza).  These schedules are capped by maximum values that do not represent the value of superior 
commercial animals.  Policies are available to insure the difference between the value indemnified 
according to the published government schedule and the value of the animal under regular, non-
disease market conditions.  The leading German agricultural insurer (R+V subsidiary VTG) offers 
policies to cover consequential losses, including government actions that interrupt trade (lost markets) 
and reduced reproduction rates.   
 
Potential Benefits and Obstacles of Livestock Disease Insurance 
 
Livestock disease insurance products have the potential to complement current disease management 
practices.  Livestock disease insurance guidelines would require producers to be involved actively in 
the management of a disease event, minimizing total economic impacts.  Livestock disease insurance 
may also assure lenders that loans are protected in the event of a catastrophic disease event, thereby 
providing continued access to capital markets for producers.     
 
Although the potential benefits of livestock disease insurance could be significant, challenges exist.  
Insurance may increase the incentive for producers to commit bad acts  (moral hazard),  which 
increases the probability or size of a loss caused by the behavior of the producer (Kunreuther, 2002).  
Adverse selection, a specific type of moral hazard, would occur in animal production when producers 
with lax biosecurity choose to insure more frequently than those producers with better biosecurity.   
Inspections and co-payments are commonly used to protect against moral hazard in insurance and 
would be necessary when insuring for livestock diseases.   
 
While two types of insurance policies, alternative value and consequential loss, have been discussed in 
this article as the most easily integrated into the animal disease indemnification schedule, the wording 
of the Animal Health Protection Act (AHPA) may be a limitation in the near term to the development of 
livestock disease insurance.  The AHPA legislates that indemnity payments must be reduced by any 
compensation  received  from any  state  or  other source,  i.e.,  all insurance  and  indemnity payments   
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cannot exceed  the market value  of the animal.  This may imply that any insurance payment resulting 




Animal health is a public good managed at the federal and state government and at the individual 
producer level.  Livestock diseases can cause significant losses to agriculture and other industries.  
Livestock producers are compensated, though not always at market value, for depopulated animals.  
However, uncompensated consequential losses resulting from an eradication program can be 
considerable.  Recent legislation has made it possible for the USDA-RMA to support the development 
of insurance for livestock, including disease coverage.   
 
Livestock disease insurance could potentially provide relief to producers for consequential losses and 
the difference between market and indemnity values (alternative value).  Consequential losses, 
including business interruption, welfare (feeding and care) costs for animals, and loss of markets, are 
not eligible for current U.S. government indemnification.  Also, producers may not receive full market 
value for their animals because of budgetary limitations.  Providing insurance to make up the difference 
between market value and indemnification value (what the government actually pays based on the 
market value) and for consequential losses seems to offer the best opportunity for developing livestock 
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